United States v. Grant: A Step in the Right Direction to Providing Non-Incorrigible Juvenile Offenders a Meaningful Opportunity for  Release by Santola, Samantha
SANTOLA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019 7:29 PM 
 
589 
UNITED STATES V. GRANT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT 
DIRECTION TO PROVIDING NON-INCORRIGIBLE JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR RELEASE 
Samantha L. Santola* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The unique characteristics of juvenile offenders that make them 
inherently different from adults play a significant role under the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  The Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that juveniles have distinctive rights and 
additional protections in the criminal sentencing process.1  According to the 
Court, the “distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological 
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even 
when they commit terrible crimes.”2  In short, the presumption for juvenile 
offenders is one of second chances. 
Recent legislative trends apply restrictions on sentencing juvenile 
offenders.3  This goes hand in hand with trends increasing due process 
protections for juveniles, adopting scientific screening and assessment tools 
to structure decision-making processes, and implementing evidence-based 
practices to provide treatment for youth and their families.4  The shift in 
juvenile justice policy toward a focus on the developmental needs of juvenile 
offenders and the encouragement of meaningful participation in the 
community upon release coincides with the shift toward rehabilitation as a 
more prominent juvenile justice goal.5  The Court’s four key opinions6 on 
this issue largely rely on neuroscience and developmental psychology, 
basing its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment on factors affecting 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S., Rutgers Biomedical and 
Health Sciences; B.A., Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.  
 1  See infra Part III. 
 2  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).  
 3  See SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION: 2001–2011, 3 (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/document 
s/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf.  
 4  Id.  
 5  See id.  
 6  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 
(2010); Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).   
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adolescent development, competency, and culpability.7 
As research and societal expectations continue to evolve, the Supreme 
Court has continued to expand the rights of juvenile offenders and consider 
appropriate sentencing procedures in light of the four historically recognized 
penal justifications: deterrence, retribution, incarceration, and 
rehabilitation.8  As a result of advancing Supreme Court doctrine, state and 
federal courts have been presented with novel issues and arguments.  In 
particular, the Third Circuit recently held that: (1) lengthy term-of-years 
sentences are equally unconstitutional as applied to non-incorrigible juvenile 
offenders—those capable of rehabilitation and reform—and (2) sentencing 
procedures must identify non-incorrigible juvenile offenders and consider 
the national age of retirement, in addition to life expectancy, when 
structuring a meaningful opportunity for release.9  This was a positive step 
toward promoting the wellness of juvenile offenders, as well as public safety 
and economic concerns of the nation as a whole.  This Comment will discuss 
why the Third Circuit decision was a step in the right direction and propose 
theories of rehabilitation and recovery to guide better metrics for drawing 
lines in rule making. 
Grant and its implications are relevant not only to the Third Circuit, but 
to the nation as a whole as well.  The Third Circuit reheard oral argument en 
banc on February 20, 2019, but has yet to issue its final opinion.10  
Simultaneously, with its granting of certiorari in Mathena v. Malvo, the 
Supreme Court is poised to decide whether its decision in an earlier case11 
modifies a substantive rule of constitutional law such that it must be given 
retroactive effect, vacating the Respondent’s sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole for crimes committed at age seventeen.12  This Comment 
 
 7  It is helpful to clarify that, although courts and researchers use the term “culpability” 
in this context, it is not to suggest that juveniles do not have the requisite mens rea to be 
convicted of their crimes.  Rather, notions of diminished culpability indicate that juveniles’ 
blameworthiness is diminished by the attributes of youth, such that juveniles are less 
deserving of sentences that mirror the severity of sentences applied to adults who commit 
similar crimes.   
 8  See infra Part III. 
 9  United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 146–48, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 10  United States v. Grant, 905 F.3d 285, 285 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 11  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (holding that the Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Alabama—that mandatory life without parole for those who were minors at the time of their 
crime violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment—
must be given retroactive effect because it modifies a substantive rule of constitutional law.).  
 12  Malvo v. Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (Mar. 
18, 2019) (No. 18-217).  In 2002, Malvo and another individual, Muhammad, killed ten 
people in sniper attacks.  Muhammad was sentenced to death and executed in 2009.  Malvo, 
however, was seventeen at the time of the attacks and was sentenced to life in prison.  He 
challenged these decisions, arguing that his sentence must be vacated because Montgomery 
modified a substantive rule of constitutional law and should therefore be applied retroactively 
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will discuss the specific issues of the Third Circuit’s original opinion in 
Grant, but will assess broader theories in doing so in order to advocate for a 
more sound sentencing doctrine. 
Part II will lay out the scope of the juvenile incarceration problem.  Part 
III will discuss Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
as applied to juvenile offenders.  Part IV will analyze the United States v. 
Grant decision and its sentencing standard that builds upon Supreme Court 
precedent.  Part V will evaluate how Grant was in line with the Supreme 
Court doctrine and was an integral step toward a sentencing scheme that 
accounts for retributivist and rehabilitative goals.  Part V will further argue 
for the development of a framework that provides for a screening, 
assessment, and treatment model to provide non-incorrigible juvenile 
offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release, and account for 
economic and policy concerns surrounding incarceration.  Grant develops 
Supreme Court precedent, but does not go far enough given insights from 
other fields related to juvenile justice. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE JUVENILE INCARCERATION PROBLEM AND MENTAL 
HEALTH AMONG OFFENDERS 
The United States has one of the largest prison populations in the 
world.13  Despite the declining rate of juvenile incarceration, the United 
States continues to incarcerate more youth and adolescents than any other 
industrialized nation.14  This poses significant social and economic burdens 
on the nation as a whole.  On average, the United States spends $148,767 to 
incarcerate one juvenile for one year in the most expensive confinement 
system15—nearly thirteen times the $11,454 it invests in a single child’s 
education.16  Additionally, the United States incurs between $7.90 billion 
and $21.47 billion in long-term costs resulting from youth incarceration.17  
 
to his own sentencing.  Id. at 266–67.   
 13  VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT, (2010), https://www.sentencingproj 
ect.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf.   
 14  NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF JUVENILE PRISON 12–13 
(2016).  The US incarcerates juveniles at eighteen times the rate of France, seven times the 
rate of Great Britain, and five times the rate of South Africa, its closest competitor.  Id.   
 15  AMANDA PETTERUTI, MARC SCHINDLER & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., 
STICKER SHOCK: CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH INCARCERATION 3 (Sarah E. 
Baker ed., 2014).   
 16  STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR 
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR 
2015) 2 (2017).   
 17  PETTERUTI, supra note 15.  This figure includes costs of recidivism, lost future 
earnings of confined youth, lost future government tax revenue, additional Medicare and 
Medicaid spending, and costs of sexual assault on confined youth.  Id.  
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This figure pales in comparison to that of a juvenile with a mental disability.  
In 2007, a study prepared for the Chief Probation Officers of California and 
the California Mental Health Directors Association surveyed eighteen 
counties and found that a juvenile with a mental illness can cost at least 
$18,800 more than other incarcerated youth.18 
More than half of all incarcerated individuals have mental health 
disabilities.19 Approximately 50 to 75% of the two million youth 
encountering the juvenile justice system each year20 meet criteria for a 
mental health disorder, and approximately 40 to 80% of incarcerated 
juveniles have at least one diagnosable mental health disorder.21  
Understanding the connection between mental health and juvenile offending 
is a crucial component to rehabilitation, as mental health is both directly and 
indirectly linked to subsequent delinquency.22  Further, life-without-parole 
(LWOP) sentences disproportionately impact the most marginalized and 
vulnerable children, as juveniles who commit the most severe crimes are 
significantly more likely than the general population to have been exposed 
to adverse childhood experiences—75 to 93%23 versus 25 to 34%, 
respectively.24  Adverse childhood experiences include physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, emotional abuse, emotional neglect, physical neglect, 
household substance abuse, household mental illness, parental separation, 
and having an incarcerated household member.25  Research demonstrates 
that exposure to trauma significantly impacts brain development and 
 
 18  EDWARD COHEN & JANE PFEIFER, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL. AND CAL. MENTAL 
HEALTH DIRS. ASS’N, COSTS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH WITH MENTAL ILLNESS vi (2008).  
 19  SAMHSA Awards Nearly $21.6 Million in Grants to Help People Transition from the 
Criminal Justice System to the Community, SAMHSA (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.icfhinc.org/news_details.asp?news=50. [hereinafter SAMHSA Awards Grants 
for Transition Services].  
 20  Lee A. Underwood & Aryssa Washington, Mental Illness and Juvenile Offenders, 13 
INT’L J. OF ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 228, 229–30 (2016).  Demographers predict that one 
in three American children will be arrested by age twenty-three.  Robert Brame et al., 
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 
25 (2012).   
 21  Underwood & Washington, supra note 2020, at 229–30; see also BROWN, supra note 
3, at 8.   
 22  Underwood & Washington, supra note 2020, at 230. 
 23  Michelle Evans-Chase, Addressing Trauma and Psychosocial Development in 
Juvenile Justice-Involved Youth: A Synthesis of the Developmental Neuroscience, Juvenile 
Justice and Trauma Literature, 3 LAWS 744, 745 (2014).  Among children sentenced to 
LWOP, 79% have witnessed violence in their homes, almost 46.9% have been physically 
abused, and 20.5% have been sexually abused.  ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE 
LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 2 (2012).  
 24  THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF 
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 8 (2018).   
 25  Id.  
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chemistry26 and is associated with a lessened capacity for emotional self-
regulation, increased violent behavior,27 increased impulsive behavior, 
increased risk-taking behavior, and decreased self-control.28 
Both the prefrontal cortex of the brain, which controls executive 
functioning, and the limbic system, which processes emotions, rewards, and 
punishments, continue to develop through adolescence.29  Eighteen is “the 
peak age for criminal behavior, and 90[%] of all juvenile offenders desist 
from crime by their mid-[twenties], evidencing likely rehabilitation for 
children and teenagers who commit serious crimes.”30  Thus, “while the 
impacts of trauma provide critical context for children who commit serious 
crimes, the plasticity of children’s brains makes them especially amenable 
to rehabilitation, therapy, and positive growth.”31 
Offenders with mental health and substance use disorders have 
difficulty accessing quality behavioral health services due to a lack of health 
care, job skills, education, stable housing, and connections with community 
behavioral health providers.32  Most juvenile justice systems do not have the 
facilities to properly screen or treat youth with mental health disorders; risks 
of victimization, self-injury, and suicide are high among those who become 
incarcerated.33  Further preventing access to needed services jeopardizes 
recovery and increases the likelihood of relapse or re-arrest.34  As a result of 
this realization, state policies have had an increased focus on providing 
proper screening, assessment, and treatment services for young offenders 
with mental health needs.35  Still, only about one-third of state prisoners and 
 
 26  Michael T. Baglivio et al., The Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) 
in the Lives of Juvenile Offenders, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 3 (2014).   
 27  Evans-Chase, supra note 2323, at 745.   
 28  Annette Streeck-Fischer et al., Down Will Come Baby, Cradle and All: Diagnostic and 
Therapeutic Implications of Chronic Trauma on Child Development, 34 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. 
PSYCHOL. 903, 915 (2000).  
 29  LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
ADOLESCENCE 70 (2014). 
 30  THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF 
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 4 (2018) (citing 
ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE 
SENTENCING 7 (2015)).   
 31  Id.   
 32  Reentry Resources for Individuals, Providers, Communities, and States, SAMHSA 
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/topics/criminal_juvenile_justice/r 
eentry-resource 
s-for-consumers-providers-communities-states.pdf.  [Hereinafter Reentry Resources].  
 33  NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR YOUTH IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A COMPENDIUM OF PROMISING PRACTICES 3 (2004).   
 34  Id. at 1. 
 35  BROWN, supra note 3, at 8, 10 (providing highlights of significant juvenile mental 
health laws in Arizona, Connecticut, California, Georgia, New Jersey, Colorado, Montana, 
Tennessee, and Iowa).  
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one-sixth of local jail inmates with mental health disabilities have received 
treatment since admission.36 
This poses a significant barrier to rehabilitation and the opportunity to 
prove that an inmate is capable of reform and thus deserving of release.  
Without sufficient services and treatment programs, offenders will continue 
to demonstrate symptoms that affect behavior and hinder rehabilitation.  For 
example, rule violations and injuries from physical altercations are more 
common among inmates with mental health diagnoses.37  Additionally, 
offenders that serve longer sentences are more likely to become 
institutionalized, lose supportive contacts in the community, and become 
removed from recovery opportunities; each of these considerations promote 
recidivism.38  Retributivism appropriately stresses the notion that criminal 
offenders deserve punishments proportional to the crimes committed and the 
circumstances surrounding each offense.  Rehabilitative goals, however, 
must work in collaboration with retributivist notions to lessen the detrimental 
effects of incarceration of juvenile offenders, both on the individual 
offenders and on society as a whole. 
III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: HOW IT APPLIES TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
Adolescence is a period of heightened neuroplasticity, meaning that the 
brain has a heightened capacity for positive change.39  This is the foundation 
for the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment and 
applying its protections to juvenile offenders, as the Court recognized that a 
child’s traits are less fixed than an adult’s.40 
A. Supreme Court Cases Interpreting the Eighth Amendment and 
Establishing Guidelines for Sentencing Juvenile Offenders 
The Eighth Amendment demands adherence to these familiar words: 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”41  Under the Eighth Amendment, “the 
State must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed 
 
 36  DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, NCJ 213600, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES (2006). 
 37  Id.  
 38  Wright, supra note 1313, at 7.  
 39  Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC 
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013); ELIZABETH SCOTT ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE SENTENCING 9 (2015).   
 40  See e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 72 (2010). 
 41  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
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serious crimes.”42  Further, to determine whether a punishment is cruel and 
unusual, courts must account for societal changes.43  “The concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”44  The punishment 
should be graduated and proportional to the offense committed.45 
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed whether the death penalty was 
an appropriate sentence for a seventeen-year-old boy who planned and 
committed murder in the first degree.46  Despite evidence that the murder 
was “wantonly vile,”47 the Roper v. Simmons opinion recognized that 
children and adolescents are inherently different than adults, and granted 
juveniles additional constitutional protections under the Eighth 
Amendment.48  Therefore, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits juveniles from being 
sentenced to death for crimes they committed before age eighteen.49  The 
Court cited studies evidencing that only a small portion of adolescents who 
engage in illegal activity develop fixed patterns of criminal behavior.50  
Because adolescents’ brains are not fully developed, mental abilities such as 
self-control and the ability to take responsibility for one’s actions are 
affected.51  The Court further found an existing “consensus” in society that 
juveniles are not as blameworthy as adults guilty of similar crimes,52 noting 
that “[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is 
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a 
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”53  The Court relied 
upon evidence that the majority of States rejected the juvenile death penalty, 
and the punishment was infrequently used even where it remained a viable 
punishment.54  Thus, the Court held that the “differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a 
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability.”55 
 
 42  Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. 
 43  Id. at 58.  
 44  Id. at 59.  
 45  Id.  
 46  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557–60 (2005). 
 47  Id. at 557.  
 48  Id. at 561–62. 
 49  Id. at 578.  
 50  Id. at 570 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).  
 51  See id. at 569–70.  
 52  Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.  
 53  Id. at 571. 
 54  Id. at 567.  
 55  Id. at 572–73.  
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In 2010, the Supreme Court again expanded the doctrine promulgated 
in Roper when a sixteen-year-old boy was charged as an adult, pleaded guilty 
to armed burglary with assault and attempted battery, and received the 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole.56  In Graham v. 
Florida, the court sentenced the adolescent offender to the maximum 
sentence on each charge, which was life imprisonment for armed burglary 
and fifteen years for attempted armed robbery.57  “Because Florida ha[d] 
abolished its parole system. . . a life sentence [allowed] no possibility of 
release.”58  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of LWOP 
on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide crime constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.59  
None of the recognized goals of penal sanctions—retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provided an adequate justification for 
such a sentence.60  Significantly, the Court further held that while the Eighth 
Amendment does not require a State to release an offender during his 
lifetime, it must provide each individual with “some meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”61  It 
could not be conclusively determined at the time of sentencing that the 
juvenile offender would be a danger to society for the rest of his life.62 
The categorical rule developed by the Graham decision provides all 
juvenile non-homicide offenders “a chance to demonstrate maturity and 
reform,” as they should not be deprived of hope, the chance for fulfillment 
outside prison walls, the chance for reconciliation with society, or “the 
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human 
worth and potential.”63  The Court noted that international opinion also 
weighs overwhelmingly against LWOP sentences for non-homicide offenses 
committed by juveniles.64  Determining that a juvenile offender will continue 
to be a danger to society throughout his life is determining that the juvenile 
is “incorrigible.”65  Incorrigibility, however, is “inconsistent with youth.”66  
“Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for 
 
 56  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57 (2010). 
 57  Id. at 57.  The sentencing judge tried the juvenile offender as an adult, reasoning that 
the adolescent’s escalating pattern of criminal conduct suggested that deviant behavior would 
continue throughout his life, and the court should try to protect the community from the 
defendant’s future criminal actions.  Id.   
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. at 81–82. 
 60  Id. at 71.   
 61  Id. at 75. 
 62  Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.   
 63  Id. at 79.   
 64  Id. at 81 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)).   
 65  Id. at 72.   
 66  Id. at 73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. App. 1968). 
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remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”67  Inmates not eligible for parole 
consideration are often deprived of counseling, education, and rehabilitation 
programs.68  Thus, a LWOP sentence improperly denied the offender an 
opportunity to demonstrate growth, maturity, and rehabilitation.69 
Shortly after Graham, the Supreme Court expanded upon this doctrine 
yet again in Miller v. Alabama, where two fourteen-year-old boys were 
convicted of murder and sentenced to LWOP.70  This “landmark”71 decision 
announced that mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders 
are unconstitutional violations of the Eighth Amendment.72  The Court 
reasoned that allowing such sentencing schemes to exist poses too great a 
risk of disproportionate punishment.73  Punishment must be appropriate to 
the crime committed, and proportionality must take into account “the 
mitigating qualities of youth.”74  The Court found fault in such mandatory 
sentencing schemes, noting that the decision-maker who originally 
sentenced the two defendants had no discretion to impose different 
punishments because state law mandated that each juvenile serve a LWOP 
sentence, “even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its 
attendant characteristics, along with the nature of this crime, made a lesser 
sentence . . . more appropriate.”75 
The Court’s rationale originated from the previous Roper and Graham 
decisions.  A mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme prevents consideration 
of an offender’s “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change”76 
by precluding consideration of an offender’s age and its “hallmark” features, 
such as immaturity, impulsiveness, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences77—qualities that make youth less culpable for their crimes.78  
Mandatory LWOP schemes prevent sentencing courts from taking into 
account the family and surrounding environment from which a juvenile 
offender cannot usually extricate himself.79  The mandatory sentencing 
practice in Miller forced the sentencing court to neglect the circumstances of 
the homicide offense, including the extent of the offender’s participation in 
 
 67  Id. at 79.   
 68  Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.   
 69  Id. at 73.   
 70  567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 71  BROWN, supra note 3, at 4.  
 72  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 502 (2012).  
 73  Id. at 479.   
 74  Id. at 476.  
 75  Id. at 465.   
 76  Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2010)).  
 77  Id. at 477.  
 78  Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72).  
 79  Id. at 477.  
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the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.80  
The Court further noted that mandatory LWOP schemes also ignore that an 
offender might have been convicted of a lesser crime if not for attributes 
related to maturity associated with youth, such as the inability to deal with 
police officers or prosecutors, to negotiate a plea agreement, or to assist 
defense attorneys.81  This puts youth at a significant disadvantage in criminal 
proceedings.82  Courts must examine all circumstances of a case, including 
youth and its attendant characteristics, in order to initiate an appropriate 
sentence.83  Thus, mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes that apply to 
juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.84 
In 2016, the Montgomery v. Louisiana held that, because the Miller 
decision declared a new substantive rule of constitutional law, it thus applies 
retroactively on collateral review.85  This does not mean that states must re-
sentence each offender.86  Rather, states may remedy Miller violations by 
considering juvenile homicide offenders for parole.87 
B. How Other Courts Apply the Graham and Miller Doctrine 
Several circuit courts have similarly applied the Graham and Miller 
doctrine to cases of de facto LWOP sentences—those which are not 
technically mandatory but are functionally mandatory.88  In McKinley v. 
Butler, the Seventh Circuit applied Miller to invalidate a de facto life 
sentence in the form of a 100-year sentence with no chance of early release 
imposed on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender.89  The court emphasized the 
importance of the logic behind Miller’s finding that children are inherently 
different than adults, and held that this consideration “cannot logically be 
limited to de jure life sentences, as distinct from sentences denominated in 
numbers of years yet highly likely to result in imprisonment for life.”90  The 
Seventh Circuit further stated that this logic applies whether or not the 
legislature has made the life sentence discretionary or mandatory, holding 
that “even discretionary life sentences must be guided by consideration of 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 477–78.   
 82  Id. at 478 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 78).  
 83  Id. at 477, 483.   
 84  Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.   
 85  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).   
 86  Id. at 736.  
 87  Id.  
 88  See e.g., McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 89  Id. at 911.   
 90  Id.  
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age-relevant factors.”91  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit applied Graham to hold 
a 254-year sentence unconstitutional on the grounds that both LWOP and de 
facto LWOP “deny the juvenile the chance to return to society.”92  The 
sentence was deemed “irreconcilable with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender must be provided with ‘some meaningful opportunity’ 
to reenter society.”93  The court noted that Graham’s focus was not on the 
label of a “life sentence,” but “rather on the difference between life in prison 
with, or without, possibility of parole.”94  The Tenth Circuit ruled similarly 
in Budder v. Addison, holding that a sentence of 155 years violated the 
Eighth Amendment under Graham.95  “Graham addressed any sentence that 
would deny a juvenile nonhomicide offender a realistic opportunity to obtain 
release, regardless of the label a state places on that sentence.”96  The court 
refused to permit states to escape Graham’s categorical rule merely because 
a punishment is not labeled “life without parole.”97 
District and state courts have also followed suit, recognizing that there 
is no meaningful difference between a mandatory LWOP sentence and a 
sentence styled as a mere mandatory term of years that effectively obtains 
the same result.98  For example, State v. Null held that “[t]he prospect of 
geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the opportunity for release at all, 
does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the ‘maturity 
and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter society as required 
by Graham.”99  The court reasoned that the Miller doctrine is neither crime-
specific nor punishment-specific, as the notions “that ‘children are different’ 
and that they are categorically less culpable than adult offenders apply as 
fully in this case [involving a lengthy term-of-years sentence] as in any 
other.”100  “After the juvenile’s transient impetuosity ebbs and the juvenile 
matures and reforms, the incapacitation objective can no longer seriously be 
served, and the statutorily mandated delay of parole” purposelessly causes 
 
 91  Id.  
 92  Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). 
 93  Id. at 1194 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).  
 94  Id. at 1192.  The court noted that “‘there are no constitutionally significant 
distinguishable facts’ between Graham’s and Moore’s sentences.”  Id. at 1191 (quoting Cudio 
v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
 95  851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017).  
 96  Id. at 1053 n.4.  
 97  Id. at 1056.  
 98  See e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).  
 99  836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).  
 100  Id. (holding that all mandatory minimum sentences imprisoning juvenile offenders are 
unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of Iowa’s state constitution 
because mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles are too punitive and inhibit the 
rehabilitative ideal).  
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continued pain and suffering.101  Similarly, Funchess v. Prince held that 
Louisiana’s parole procedure did “little in the way of actually making parole 
a possibility” and, as such, did not provide a meaningful opportunity for 
release under Miller.102  State v. Pearson went a step further and held that a 
thirty-five-year sentence without the possibility of parole “violates the core 
teachings of Miller,”103 “effectively depriv[ing] [the defendant] of any 
chance of an earlier release and the possibility of leading a more normal adult 
life.”104  One judge opined that “limiting the techniques and protections of 
these recent cases to only the harshest penalties known to law is as illogical 
as it is unjust.”105  The court further directed sentencing courts to consider 
rehabilitation106 as well as the mitigating features of youth pursuant to Miller 
when sentencing juvenile offenders.107  More recently, People v. Holman 
held that both mandatory and discretionary life sentences for juvenile 
offenders are disproportionate and unconstitutional, unless mitigating factors 
such as youth and its attendant characteristics are appropriately considered 
at the time of sentencing.108  The Supreme Court of Illinois stated that a 
juvenile offender may be sentenced to LWOP “only if the trial court 
determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, 
permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of 
rehabilitation.”109 
Today, a majority of states ban LWOP sentences for children or have 
no one serving the sentence.110  Since the Court decided Montgomery in 
2016, the number of individuals serving LWOP for offenses committed as 
children has been reduced by 60% because of judicial advances and 
 
 101  State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977)). 
 102  No. 14-2105, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23131, at *15 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2016) (holding 
that, because of these obstacles, the sentencing court imposed what amounted to a mandatory 
life sentence with no meaningful opportunity to obtain release, regardless that the prisoner 
would be eligible for parole in 40 years).  
 103  836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013).  
 104  Id.  
 105  Id. at 98 (Cady, C.J., concurring). 
 106  Id. at 97.  “To predict that a juvenile cannot be rehabilitated is very difficult.”  Id.  
 107  Id.  
 108  91 N.E.3d 849, 861 (Ill. 2017).  
 109  Id. at 863. 
 110  The number of states that do not allow LWOP to be imposed on children has increased 
from five states in 2012 to twenty-six states and the District of Columbia in 2019.  States That 
Ban Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, 
https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/mediaresources/states-that-ban-life/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2019).  In at least six additional states (Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New 
York, and Rhode Island), no one is serving LWOP for an offense committed as a child.  THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF STATES 
ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 5, 12 n.18 (2018).   
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legislative reform,111 and for those whose LWOP sentences have been 
reformed as a result, the median sentence nationwide is twenty-five years 
before parole or release eligibility, which means that “most individuals who 
were sentenced to die in prison as children now have an opportunity for 
release, but they will not be eligible for a review opportunity or release until 
they are at least in their [forties] or older.”112  This demonstrates that states 
are beginning to move in the right direction to provide opportunities for 
release at younger ages; yet, many individuals are still serving lengthy 
sentences that may not allow or effectively provide for meaningful reentry 
into society, especially since there remains a lack of a rehabilitation focus to 
promote wellness, recovery, and meaningful participation in the community. 
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH: UNITED STATES V. GRANT 
Following the Supreme Court’s direction, the Third Circuit focused 
squarely on the plight of non-incorrigible juvenile offenders facing 
constructively LWOP sentences—a result that Miller and Graham suggest is 
rarely permissible.113  In response to issues surrounding de facto LWOP, the 
Third Circuit approached de facto LWOP as equally unconstitutional in light 
of Supreme Court doctrine.114  Despite its allegedly horrific facts, United 
States v. Grant attempted to effectuate Supreme Court doctrine, examining 
the constitutionality of lengthy term-of-year sentences and the contours of 
the an offender’s right to a meaningful opportunity for release.115  In Grant, 
Corey Grant, a member of an organized gang of teenagers called the E-Port 
Posse, was convicted of RICO conspiracy, racketeering,116 various drug 
trafficking charges, and possession of a weapon in relation to a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking—crimes committed between ages thirteen and 
sixteen.117  Although “the District Court determined that Grant’s upbringing, 
 
 111  THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF 
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 6 (2018).  Still, children 
continue to receive LWOP at a disproportionate rate in several jurisdictions.  Id. at 7. 
 112  Id. at 6. 
 113  See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 
(2010).  
 114  United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 115  See generally United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 116  As predicates for the racketeering charge, a jury found that Grant murdered one 
individual and attempted to murder another.  Id. at 136.  On one occasion, Grant encountered 
a group of rival drug dealers while delivering drugs for the E-Port Posse and confronted a 
former member of the E-Port Posse, Dion Lee; Grant and an associate shot Dion in the leg.  
Id.  Later that month, Grant encountered Dion’s brother, Mario, another independent drug 
dealer who was warned not to operate within the Posse’s territory.  Id.  Grant confronted 
Mario, who began to retreat.  Id.  Grant ordered his associate to shoot Mario to prevent escape, 
and the associate killed Mario.  Id.  
 117  Id. at 134–35.  
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debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record 
demonstrated that he had the capacity to reform and that a LWOP sentence 
was therefore inappropriate under Miller,” Grant received a term of sixty-
five years without parole.118  Grant challenged the constitutionality of this 
sentence, contending that he would be released at age seventy-two at the 
earliest—the same age as his life expectancy—which “constitutes de facto 
LWOP and therefore fails to account for his capacity for reform and to afford 
him a meaningful opportunity for release.”119 
Relying on the Supreme Court doctrine as established, the Third Circuit 
extended Miller, holding that a term-of-years sentence that meets or exceeds 
the life-expectancy of a non-incorrigible juvenile offender violates the 
Eighth Amendment.120  For the same reasons that mandatory LWOP 
sentences are unconstitutional as applied to children and adolescents, the 
court found de facto LWOP sentences inherently disproportionate for 
juveniles still capable of reform.121  Three considerations led the court to its 
conclusion: (1) Miller reserves the sentence of LWOP only for permanently 
incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders; (2) the Supreme Court’s 
justifications for its position on LWOP sentences apply equally to de facto 
LWOP sentences; and (3) de facto LWOP sentences are irreconcilable with 
the Graham and Miller requirement that non-incorrigible juvenile offenders 
be provided with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”122  De facto LWOP sentences 
“cannot possibly provide a meaningful opportunity for release” because the 
offender effectively spends the rest of his life in prison, prevented from ever 
reentering society.123 
Like the de jure LWOP sentence, a de facto LWOP sentence lacks 
proportionality.124  Each consideration supporting the Graham decision 
applies with equal strength to the Third Circuit’s treatment of non-
incorrigible juvenile offenders.125  These include “the impotence of deterring 
juveniles, the shortcomings of retribution as a result of diminished 
culpability, the increased opportunity for reform that vitiates incapacitation, 
and the irreconcilable tension between LWOP sentences and 
rehabilitation.”126  As a result of this decision, the court instructed sentencing 
 
 118  Id. at 135. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 142.   
 121  Grant, 887 F.3d at 142.  
 122  Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)); see also Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). 
 123  Id. at 145. 
 124  Id. at 143–44.   
 125  Id. at 144.  
 126  Id.  
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judges to conduct individualized evidentiary hearings to determine each non-
incorrigible homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing the 
individual to a term-of-years sentence that may meet or exceed his 
mortality.127  A constitutional punishment must “fit[] the offender and not 
merely the crime.”128 
The Third Circuit further held that the national age of retirement, in 
addition to a juvenile offender’s life expectancy, must be considered as a 
sentencing factor in order to properly structure a meaningful opportunity for 
release.129  “Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance 
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with 
society, no hope.”130  Similarly, hope for the potential of only a few years in 
the community is not an appropriate standard for a meaningful opportunity 
for release.131  To effectuate this opinion, the Grant Court sought to develop 
a legal framework to carry out the Supreme Court doctrine by providing 
guidance for giving minimum constitutional protections.132  Structuring a 
meaningful opportunity for release must begin with a factual determination 
of the juvenile offender’s life expectancy so that an offender who is capable 
of reform is not sentenced to a term-of-years beyond his expected 
mortality.133  This will also allow sentencing courts to calculate the amount 
of time the offender will have to reenter society after an opportunity for 
release.134 
Next, sentencing courts must “shape a sentence that properly accounts 
for a meaningful opportunity for release,” which must provide for hope, a 
chance for fulfillment outside of incarceration, reconciliation with society, 
and the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of 
human potential.135  This poses the issue of determining at what age an 
offender should be able to meaningfully reenter society.136  Because society 
accepts the national age of retirement as “a transitional life stage where an 
individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to 
society over the course of his or her working life,” the Third Circuit 
 
 127  Grant, 887 F.3d at 149.  “Critically, in addition to actuarial tables, lower courts should 
consider any evidence made available by the parties that bears on the offender’s mortality, 
such as medical examinations, medical records, family medical history, and pertinent expert 
testimony.”  Id. at 150. 
 128  Id. at 150 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).  
 129  Id. at 153. 
 130  Id. at 147 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).   
 131  Id. at 148.   
 132  Id. at 148–49. 
 133  Grant, 887 F.3d at 149. 
 134  Id.  
 135  Id. at 150 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)). 
 136  Id.  
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mandated that sentencing processes consider the national age of retirement 
as an additional factor for sentencing determinations.137 
This decision furthers the individualized sentencing approach 
promulgated in Miller,138 which requires consideration of a juvenile 
offender’s age and its attendant characteristics that diminish culpability, in 
order to determine whether or not LWOP is a proportionate sentence.139  
Miller determined that sentencing a child to LWOP is excessive for all but 
the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”140  
For the majority of juvenile offenders, whose crimes instead reflect the 
“transient immaturity”141 of youth, LWOP is an unconstitutional penalty.  
For the same reasons, de facto LWOP that provides a non-incorrigible 
juvenile offender with little or no time to meaningfully engage in society 
outside of incarceration—due to a term-of-years sentence that ends close to 
the offender’s life expectancy—should also be recognized as penalty in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
V. GRANT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION FOR NON-INCORRIGIBLE 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
United States v. Grant is consistent with Supreme Court doctrine.  But 
where Grant falls short is in its range of analysis surrounding incorrigibility 
and juveniles’ capability for reform.  Moving forward, courts should 
consider the interaction of retributive and rehabilitative ideals to construct 
individualized sentences relating to key recovery themes, principles for 
effective treatment programs, and vocational rehabilitation. 
A. Grant is Consistent with the Established Supreme Court Doctrine 
Notably, the Supreme Court based its decisions not only on common 
sense—on what “any parent knows”—but on science and social science 
realities as well.142  The evidence supporting the Roper and Graham 
decisions has become more strongly supported by research in developmental 
 
 137  Id. at 150–51.   
 138  Id. at 141.  
 139  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 n.6. (2012).  
 140  Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).  
 141  Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73.  The phrase “transient immaturity” is not used to 
minimize the severity of crimes committed.  Rather, it is used to emphasize that the signature 
qualities of youth are transient (temporary); dominating characteristics such as recklessness 
and impulsivity subside with maturity.  “Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents 
who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior 
that persists into adulthood.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth 
S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished 
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).   
 142  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).   
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psychology and neuroscience, which demonstrates that “adolescent brains 
are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order 
executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk 
avoidance.”143  The retribution rationale of the criminal justice system relates 
to a person’s blameworthiness.  Therefore, although sentences should reflect 
the severity of the crime committed, the case for retribution is weaker for 
minors than for adults.144  Similarly, deterrence is less effective because the 
characteristics that render youth less culpable than adults also render youth 
less likely to consider consequences.145 
With this, the Miller Court took the notion of distinguishing between 
incorrigible and non-incorrigible offenders one step further than the Graham 
decision, noting that rehabilitation similarly could not justify a mandatory 
sentence of LWOP.146  The Miller decision retained the distinction between 
homicide and non-homicide offenses committed by youth; while Graham 
established a flat ban for non-homicide offenses, the Miller decision called 
for individualized sentencing for homicide offenses,147 holding that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for 
juvenile offenders.148  Significantly, “[e]ven if a court considers a child’s age 
before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates 
the Eighth Amendment for a child” capable of reform.149  Miller does not 
foreclose a judge’s ability to make the judgment, in homicide cases, that a 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption deserves a 
LWOP sentence.150  The Supreme Court doctrine, however, does require 
judges to take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 
prison without an opportunity to meaningfully reenter and participate within 
the community.151 
In accordance with the Supreme Court doctrine, the Grant decision 
similarly does not bar judges from utilizing discretion to direct sentences, 
including LWOP or lengthy term-of-years sentences.  Such sentences may 
be constitutional under extreme circumstances as applied to non-incorrigible 
 
 143  Id. at 471 n.5 (quoting Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 
10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Brief for APA]).  
 144  Id. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71).  
 145  Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72). 
 146  Id. at 472–73. 
 147  Id. at 474 n.6.   
 148  Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. 
 149  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).  
 150  Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80.  
 151  Id. at 480.  
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juvenile offenders.152  The Grant decision merely fleshes out the Supreme 
Court doctrine to further direct sentencing decision-makers charged with the 
responsibility of determining how to frame a meaningful opportunity for 
release.  In its Petition for Rehearing, the government argued that the Grant 
Court’s identification of retirement age was arbitrary and an issue for the 
legislature.153  The court, however, adopted only a rebuttable presumption 
that juvenile offenders capable of rehabilitation and reform should be 
afforded opportunities for release before the national age of retirement; it did 
not adopt a “hard and fast rule.”154  This was necessary “to give life to the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Graham and Miller.”155 
The Third Circuit ensured that lower courts retain discretion “to depart 
from [this presumption] in the exceptional circumstances where a juvenile 
offender is found to be capable of reform but the [United States Code] factors 
still favor a sentence beyond the national age of retirement.”156  The court 
made clear that such instances will be rare and unusual, but relied on the 
strengths that district courts possess to provide for individualized sentencing 
when prudence calls for a departure from this presumption, so long as “their 
departure is consistent with Miller’s Eighth Amendment guarantee for a 
meaningful opportunity for release.”157 
Additionally, as Grant argued on appeal, consideration of the national 
age of retirement was only one component of a thoughtful framework, which 
also included consideration of life expectancy, any factors set forth in 
relevant statutes and legal standards, and the need to provide a chance for 
“fulfillment outside prison walls” based on the unique facts of each case.158  
The court’s line-drawing was not without logic, as retirement is a late 
transitional point that society accepts as providing an “opportunity . . . to 
attend to other endeavors in life.”159  This line therefore permits long 
sentences that retributivism deems applicable in view of the severity of the 
crime committed, while ensuring the requisite chance for fulfillment outside 
prison walls. 
Indeed, the Grant Court conceded that there is no “precise line” 
marking “at what age [an offender is] still able to meaningfully reenter 
society,” and therefore failed to provide courts and sentencing decision-
 
 152  United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 152 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 153  Petition for Rehearing En Banc by Appellee the United States of America at 15, United 
States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018) (No. 16-3829).  
 154  Grant, 887 F.3d at 152. 
 155  Id.  
 156  Id. (emphasis added).  
 157  Id. at 152–53.  
 158  Id. at 150–51 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79) (emphasis added).  
 159  Grant, 887 F.3d at 150. 
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makers with clear guidelines.160  But the Third Circuit’s ruling is consistent 
with Supreme Court doctrine, which suggests individualized assessments.  
As such, the Grant decision gave standards, but not clear rules, because the 
Supreme Court has implied that these are necessary to account for the 
uniqueness of juveniles.  Just as other courts have applied the Miller doctrine 
to cases of de facto LWOP, the Grant decision appropriately applied the 
same logic to cases of de facto LWOP, while building upon the framework 
to incorporate consideration of the age of retirement in order to effectuate 
the Supreme Court’s instruction that courts effectively provide non-
incorrigible juveniles with a “realistic” and “meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”161 
B. What’s Deserved and What’s to Come: Grant is Grounded in 
Sound Policy Logic Behind Retribution and Rehabilitation 
Sentencing and Reentry Theories 
According to one Bureau of Justice Statistics study, approximately 63% 
of prisoners will be rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor, and 41% 
will be sent back to prison within three years.162  This “revolving door” has 
led to substantial reconsideration of the reentry process.163  “In 2015, federal 
efforts focused on reentry services and supports for justice-involved 
individuals with mental and substance use disorders have driven an 
expansion of programs and services.”164  For example, because incarceration 
worsens the problems that often contribute to juvenile crime, increases the 
odds of recidivism, and undermines public safety in the long term, “[m]odels 
exist—carefully designed and extensively studied—that improve the 
prospects of virtually all juvenile offenders, including the most serious,”165 
by providing a relationship-focused network of support and supervision.166  
Incorporating sentencing and reentry procedures that ensure punishment for 
wrongdoing, yet do so in a more humane manner, can benefit the nation’s 
overall wellness, economy, and public safety. 
Research indicates that a punitive focus fails to adequately address both 
public safety and economic concerns in addition to the rehabilitation needs 
 
 160  Id.  
 161  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 
479 (2012).  
 162  Doris Layton Mackenzie, Sentencing and Corrections in the 21st Century: Setting the 
Stage for the Future, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE 52–53 (2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf. 
 163  Id. at 36. 
 164  Reentry Resources, supra note 32. 
 165  NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE 10 (2016).  
 166  Id.  
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of offenders.167  Criminological research has determined that deterrent 
effects of the criminal justice system demonstrate that the certainty of 
punishment is more effective than the severity of punishment.168  Research 
indicates that reduced sentences may reduce recidivism rates.169  These 
findings suggest that the deterrent effect of lengthy prison terms will not be 
diminished if sentences are reduced.170  In fact, they suggest that shorter 
punishments reduce rates of criminal behavior and recidivism.  Thus, there 
should instead be a greater focus on rehabilitation, particularly in the juvenile 
population, as youth are more capable of reform.  Freeing up resources 
devoted to incarceration would allow for an increase in services that focus 
on prevention and treatment.171 
Public opinion regarding the juvenile justice system has been shifting 
from a punitive approach toward a rehabilitative model of care, as evidenced 
by recent legislative trends and the shift in juvenile courts.172  The mental 
health services typically offered, however, are often inadequate or 
unavailable due to insufficient resources, inadequate administrative capacity, 
lack of appropriate staffing, and lack of staff training.173  Rehabilitation is 
crucial to effective reintegration into society and to seeking fulfillment 
outside prison walls.  Charging and sentencing juveniles as adults hinders 
rehabilitative objectives.  “The rising number of juvenile prosecutions in the 
adult criminal courts conflicts with the basic philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system: that juvenile offenders, given the appropriate treatment and 
support, are capable of rehabilitation.”174  Treating juveniles as adults 
removes the opportunity for rehabilitation, focusing on punishment instead. 
Offenders serving LWOP sentences are often denied access to 
vocational and other rehabilitation services available to other inmates.175  For 
juvenile offenders, “the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment 
makes the disproportionality of the sentence . . . all the more evident.”176  
The Graham Court held that it could not be conclusively determined at the 
time of sentencing that a juvenile offender would be a danger to society for 
 
 167  Id. at 236–37.   
 168  Wright, supra note 13, at 1.   
 169  Id. at 7. 
 170  Id. at 9. 
 171  Id.  
 172  Underwood & Washington, supra note 20, at 229. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Robert Anthonsen, Furthering the Goal of Juvenile Rehabilitation, 13 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 729, 730 (2010) (quoting Gail B. Goodman, Arrested Development: An 
Alternative to Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 
1084 (2007)).  
 175  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
 176  Id.  
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the rest of his life, and a sentence of LWOP improperly denied the offender 
a chance to demonstrate growth, maturity, and rehabilitation.  Relying on 
these principles, the Grant Court created a framework for sentencing courts 
to consider to further these objectives and to ensure a meaningful opportunity 
for release based upon demonstrated rehabilitation.  In doing so, the Grant 
Court recognized that, in many circumstances, a sentence beyond the age of 
retirement similarly denies an offender who is no longer a danger to society, 
and who demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation, the opportunity to 
meaningfully reenter and participate within the community.  Therefore, 
concepts of rehabilitation and retribution should work hand in hand 
throughout sentencing to ensure that each sentence reflects the severity of 
the crime, yet provides sufficient opportunity for each individual to 
demonstrate the ability for reform. 
Significantly, despite the severe decrease in educational opportunities 
available to incarcerated youth, more than 66% aspire to higher education 
and 88% aspire to maintain steady employment in the future.177  This 
statistic, as well as research supporting juveniles’ neurological capacity for 
recovery and growth, supports the integration of services, such as vocational 
rehabilitation, to effectuate successful reentry and promote meaningful 
opportunities to participate within the community.  Incarceration, therefore, 
should not be the default response to juvenile crime.  When incarceration is 
appropriate, however, a sentencing scheme that considers the age of 
retirement,178 in conjunction with vocational rehabilitation services, offers 
hope that juvenile offenders will dedicate time to achieving their educational 
and employment goals within the community. 
Juvenile offenders are most in need of, and most receptive to, 
rehabilitation.179  Research that attempts to identify and understand traits that 
explain criminal behavior and shed light on interventions that positively 
modify behavior is premised upon theories of learning, cognition, and human 
development.180  “Although there is still some debate about the effectiveness 
of rehabilitation, recent literature reviews and meta-analyses demonstrate 
that rehabilitation can effectively change some offenders and reduce their 
criminal activities.”181  These reviews reveal that 48% to 86% of studies 
examining rehabilitation programs reported treatment effectiveness, and 
identified which treatment programs are more effective than others.182 
 
 177  BERNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 16.  
 178  Namely, Grant’s step in the right direction.  
 179  Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
 180  Mackenzie, supra note 162, at 25. 
 181  Id.  
 182  Id.  
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C. The Uniqueness of Juveniles and Miller’s Proportionality Rule: 
Why Rehabilitation and Retribution as the Primary Penological 
Goals Produce a Sounder Doctrine 
1. Key Recovery Themes, Four Basic Principles for Effective 
Treatment Programs, and Vocational Rehabilitation 
Recovery is a process of change through which individuals improve 
health and wellness, live self-directed lives, and strive to reach their full 
potential.183  According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA), the agency within the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services that leads public health efforts to advance the 
country’s behavioral health, recovery-oriented services are built on access to 
evidence-based clinical treatment and support services, which help 
individuals successfully manage mental health conditions.184  The value of 
recovery is widely accepted by the United States Surgeon General, the 
Institute of Medicine, and other organizations.185 
Recovery focuses on four dimensions: health, home, purpose, and 
community.186  Helping individuals learn to manage symptoms and make 
informed choices that support physical and emotional well-being is essential 
to meeting health goals.187  Services should also focus on the importance of 
having a stable and safe place to live, as well as having relationships that 
provide support, love, and hope.188  Crucial to the Grant decision and its 
implications on services for offenders in pursuance of a meaningful 
opportunity for release, however, is the recovery goal of having a purpose in 
life.  The concept of purpose is unique to each individual; a person’s purpose 
may consist of engaging in meaningful daily activities such as work, school, 
volunteering, family caretaking, or creative activities.189  Crucial to 
achieving and maintaining purpose is independence, income, and accessible 
resources to participate in society.190 
“Hope is the foundation of recovery,”191 and, as the Grant Court 
indicated—in keeping with the Supreme Court’s rationale—juvenile 
offenders should not be deprived of hope that they will demonstrate the 
 
 183  Recovery and Recovery Support, SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/recovery (last 
updated Jan. 15, 2019).  [Hereinafter Recovery and Recovery Support].  
 184  About Us, SAMHSA, https://www.samhsa.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).  
 185  Id. 
 186  Recovery and Recovery Support, supra note 183. 
 187  Id.   
 188  Id. 
 189  Id.   
 190  Id.  
 191  Id.  
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capacity for reform and achieve a meaningful opportunity for release.192  
Resilience is a key component to recovery and to success upon reentry into 
the community.  The ability to cope with adversity and adapt to change better 
prepares individuals for the next stressful situation.193  Reintegration into the 
community poses a variety of obstacles to becoming a meaningful, 
contributing member of society; resilience is essential to this process.  
Effective recovery goals focus not only on fostering health and resilience, 
but also on reducing barriers to employment, education, and other life goals 
through treatment, services, and community-based programs.194  Such 
services have a demonstrated improvement on quality of life195 and 
recidivism rates,196 further supporting the argument for considering 
sentencing protocols that afford non-incorrigible offenders the opportunity 
to reenter the community prior to the age of retirement. 
Effective treatment programs consist of four basic principles.  First, 
treatment must directly address criminogenic factors, particularly dynamic 
factors (changeable characteristics) directly associated with criminal 
behavior, such as attitudes, thoughts, behaviors regarding employment, 
education, peers, authority, substance abuse, and interpersonal 
relationships.197  Second, programs must foster therapeutic integrity through 
professionally tailored design and delivery.198  “Poorly implemented 
programs delivered by untrained personnel, in which offenders spend only a 
minimal amount of time, can hardly be expected to successfully reduce 
recidivism.”199  Third, effective rehabilitation programs target offenders who 
are at sufficient risk for recidivism so that reduction in recidivism rates is 
measurable; the most intensive programs should be offered to offenders with 
the highest risk of recidivism.200  “Many offenders are at low risk for future 
recidivism” and treatment programs geared towards such offenders will have 
minimal impact on future criminal activities because few of those offenders 
would have recidivated anyway.201  The Grant decision is therefore a to 
encourage rehabilitation-focused programs for non-incorrigible youth, as the 
Third Circuit recognized that even youth who commit crimes worthy of 
lengthy sentences are capable of rehabilitation and reform.202  It is this 
 
 192  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).  
 193  Recovery and Recovery Support, supra note 183.  
 194  Id.   
 195  Id.  
 196  Mackenzie, supra note 162. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id.  
 199  Id.   
 200  Id.   
 201  Id.   
 202  See generally United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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population that needs rehabilitation services in order to effectuate a reduction 
in rates of recidivism and incarceration.203  Lastly, effective treatments must 
be delivered in “modes that address the learning styles and abilities of 
offenders.”204  Several programs have been identified as those likely to 
reduce recidivism, including cognitive behavioral therapy, community 
employment programs, and vocational education programs.205 
Recovery focuses on an individual’s strengths, abilities, resources, and 
values; it is a holistic approach that addresses the whole person and the 
surrounding community.206  Vocational rehabilitation practices mirror these 
factors.  Because gainful employment impacts all areas of an individual’s 
life and wellness, effective vocational rehabilitation services could be crucial 
to successful reentry. 
A large portion of offenders with disabilities do not receive vocational 
rehabilitation services.207  The psychological effects of being an ex-offender, 
aside from the effects of disability, suggest the need for rehabilitation 
counseling to assist transition into the community.208  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that prisons that fail to provide vocational rehabilitation services 
have high recidivism rates.209  Research suggests that this is a consequence 
of depriving inmates of sufficient resources to develop the education and 
skills necessary to become productive members of society.210  Without such 
skills, individuals lose hope and motivation and tend to display chronic 
criminal behavior.211 
Vocational rehabilitation promotes higher rates of successful follow-up 
with community-based services and lower rates of recidivism.  It also 
promotes wellness in each of the four dimensions of recovery: health, home, 
purpose, and community.  Work is a critical social role.  It “provides 
economic security, intellectual or physical challenge . . . friendships and . . . 
helps to promote life satisfaction.”212  Further, work consumes more time 
than any other activity, except for sleep.213  The importance of work does not 
diminish with age; however, older individuals, and especially those with 
 
 203  See Mackenzie, supra note 162162. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id.  
 206  Recovery and Recovery Support, supra note 183.  
 207  Debra A. Harley, Vocational Rehabilitation Services for an Offender Population, 62 
J. REHAB. 45, 45 (1996).   
 208  Id. at 46–47. 
 209  Id. at 45. 
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 211  Id. at 45–46. 
 212  Bryan Kemp & Fae Kleinplatz, Vocational Rehabilitation of the Older Worker, 39 
AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 322, 322 (1985).   
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disabilities, have less success obtaining employment.214  Empirical evidence 
supports the efficacy, clinical utility, and cost effectiveness of vocational 
rehabilitation and its ability to help individuals with disabilities obtain 
competitive employment.215  A sentencing framework that implements 
vocational rehabilitation services should be presented to non-incorrigible 
offenders who have been afforded lesser sentences, as both the individual 
offender and society as a whole may benefit from meaningful contributions 
to the workforce. 
Rehabilitation counselors are central to the effective delivery of 
vocational rehabilitation services, as counselors with graduate training in 
rehabilitation counseling are moderately more effective than those without 
graduate rehabilitation degrees.216  Strong empirical evidence supports the 
efficacy of the working alliance and skills training as key factors in the 
counseling process.217 
Despite evidence suggesting that only a modest number of individuals 
in vocational rehabilitation sustain competitive employment, around 40% of 
individuals with psychiatric disabilities work steadily in competitive jobs 
after engaging in vocational rehabilitation services.218  Research indicates 
that significant non-monetary incentives exist for adults to maintain 
employment as they age, such as greater social contact and support, greater 
physical and mental activity, increased morale, a greater sense of purpose, 
and increased life satisfaction.219  This evidence emphasizes the importance 
of vocational rehabilitation in sentencing considerations and the prison 
setting and demonstrates why services should be provided to incarcerated 
individuals as early as possible.  It might be argued that the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that individuals are still afforded the opportunity “to attend to 
other endeavors in life”220 after retirement, and therefore a meaningful 
opportunity for release need not require the opportunity to reenter society 
before retirement age.  A meaningful opportunity for release, however, must 
provide an offender with the opportunity to contribute productively to 
society, a concept that inherently provides individuals with hope to reconcile 
with society and achieve fulfillment.221  A chance to pursue meaningful work 
is critical to that notion, and vocational rehabilitation services will aid in that 
 
 214  Id.  
 215  Steven R. Pruett et al., Empirical Evidence Supporting the Effectiveness of Vocational 
Rehabilitation, 74 J. REHAB. 56, 61 (2008).   
 216  Id.  
 217  Id.  
 218  Charles E. Drebing et al., Vocational Rehabilitation and Older Adults: Patterns in 
Participation and Outcome, 68 J. REHAB. 24, 24 (2002).   
 219  Id. at 25.  
 220  United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 150 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 221  Id. at 150–51.  
SANTOLA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  7:29 PM 
614 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:589 
effort. 
2. An Argument for a Sentencing Protocol and Integrative 
Transition Programs 
Sentencing systems should include assessment, screening, and the 
development of a time-sensitive rehabilitation plan.  There is a recent trend 
to adopt scientific screening and assessment tools to structure decision-
making and identify the needs of juvenile offenders.222  “Competency 
statutes and policies have become more research-based, and youth 
interventions are evidence-based across a range of programs.”223  The social, 
economic, and psychological role of work changes with age.224  For example, 
there is an increased incidence of medical problems amongst older adults, 
which may impact the ability to perform certain job functions.225  Individuals 
require different levels of care; thus, an effective screening, assessment, and 
treatment process is critical.  A constitutional punishment must “fit[] the 
offender and not merely the crime.”226 
When youth must be placed in more restrictive settings in order to 
receive basic mental health services, the likelihood of future delinquency 
increases, as does criminal behavior and arrests as adults.227  As Supreme 
Court decisions have indicated, the characteristics of the individual offender 
and the circumstances surrounding the crime committed should enlighten 
decision-makers at the sentencing stage.  These factors should also indicate 
the importance of treatment planning for efficient reintegration in order to 
promote successful participation in the community as law-abiding citizens 
upon release.  For example, state prisoners with mental health diagnoses are 
twice as likely as those without to have been homeless in the year before 
their arrest,228 and local jail inmates with mental health diagnoses are three 
times as likely to report a history of physical or sexual abuse.229  Encouraging 
earlier releases for offenders capable of reform and rehabilitating those who 
may return to the community at an age when work is a practical goal,230 
would not only help alleviate the recidivism problem, but would also 
promote wellness among offenders and realize the Supreme Court’s goal of 
ensuring a meaningful opportunity for release. 
 
 222  BROWN, supra note 3, at 3.  
 223  Id.  
 224  Drebing et al., supra note 218, at 25.   
 225  Id.   
 226  Grant, 887 F.3d at 150 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).  
 227  Underwood & Washington, supra note 20, at 234.   
 228  JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 36.   
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SANTOLA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  7:29 PM 
2019] COMMENT 615 
Nearly half of all arrests occur within the first twelve months of release.  
Thus, effective transition planning is essential.  The time following release 
is a critical time for healthcare and self-management interventions.  Even 
facilities that provide adequate treatment see those efforts derailed when 
inmates are released without adequate discharge planning to transition their 
care, or without financial or other supports.  Universal integration of pre-
release programs will decrease difficulties with finding employment, thus 
increasing access to healthcare and other services.  Research indicates that 
the criminal justice system should collaborate with the community to more 
effectively meet the needs of youth with mental health disorders.231  
Evidence further shows that, although rehabilitation methods in secure 
settings effectively change behavior within the setting, the skills do not 
transfer to the community setting.232  The most effective models of treatment 
include psychosocial interventions and an after-care plan with services to 
help the offender transfer and maintain learned skills.233  Further, lower-risk 
offenders are more negatively affected by incarceration.234  Conducting 
thorough assessments at the sentencing phase and at intervals throughout the 
incarceration period is therefore critical.  Risk factors and capacity for 
rehabilitation and reform must be identified and attended to in order to ensure 
that incarceration does not negatively affect inmates, doing more harm than 
good by increasing the likelihood of longer sentences (and the additional 
financial burdens that go with it) as well as recidivism.235  Although the Third 
Circuit was correct to encourage a sentencing scheme that contemplates 
release before the age of retirement for non-incorrigible offenders, the court 
did not go far enough.  Promise of an earlier release, without efficient 
services promoting success within the community, does not guarantee an 
offender his or her best chance to achieve fulfillment outside prison walls. 
The criminal justice system can impose high economic costs.236  
Federal, state, and local governments spend about $68 billion on 
incarceration each year.237  Additionally, increased life expectancies have 
created a need for greater financial resources to support adults as they 
continue to age.238  “The very difficult budget climate in states recently has 
prompted questions about the effectiveness of punitive reforms and the high 
economic costs they can impose.”239  States are seeking ways to produce 
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better results for juvenile offenders at a lower cost.240  This has contributed 
to a state legislative trend to realign fiscal resources from state institutions 
toward more effective community-based services.241 
Reducing the number of incarcerated non-violent offenders by half 
could save taxpayers $16.9 billion annually without compromising public 
safety.242  Additionally, the costs associated with treatment services are 
lower than costs associated with long-term sentences that fail to adequately 
deter future offenses.243  The financial benefit of adequate transition services 
as part of treatment plans is also evident.  For example, one study found that 
one dollar spent on treatment in prison yields about six dollars of savings, 
while a one dollar investment in community-based treatment yields about 
twenty dollars in savings.244 
There is a recent state trend to treat and rehabilitate youth in the juvenile 
justice system rather than the more punitive-oriented adult system.245  
Research shows that moving sixteen and seventeen year old youth out of the 
adult system and into the juvenile system will return about three dollars in 
benefits for every one dollar in cost.246  Additionally, extending the age limit 
in juvenile court has the added benefit of affecting the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of young individuals.247 
It is a common (and understandable) argument that releasing offenders 
has social costs, and that these costs must be weighed against the costs of 
incarceration.248  Recidivism causes the criminal justice system to incur costs 
related to arrests, hearings, court proceedings, and causes victims to incur 
costs as the result of property loss or the need for additional security, for 
example.249  It is unclear how to adequately calculate costs, as well as the 
number of crimes prevented by incarceration; research suggests, however, 
that the estimates of criminal activity will drastically differ if offenders are 
given a sentence of community supervision.250  Others reject social cost 
calculations and argue that the imputed costs of pain and suffering do not 
take into account the suffering of offenders, or their partners, children, and 
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communities.251  From this perspective, “cost-benefit assessments require 
weighing inherently incommensurable values, and attempts to do so have 
reached a dead-end . . . [and] that it may be more productive to compare the 
costs and benefits of alternative crime prevention policies.”252  The financial 
benefit, combined with the benefit of improving the health and wellness of 
such a significant population within the nation, supports an argument for 
shorter sentences for individuals that successfully engage in rehabilitation 
programs and demonstrate capacity for reform. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Successful reentry and maintenance of positive supports within the 
community are essential to reduced rates of delinquent behavior and 
recidivism.  There is little evidence that confining youth does anything to 
advance rehabilitative ideals.  Instead, an overwhelming amount of evidence 
indicates that incarceration is tremendously detrimental to the juvenile 
offenders themselves, as well as the national society as a whole.  
Developmental and social psychology indicate that children and adolescents 
are inherently capable of positive reform, and thorough assessment, 
rehabilitation, and transition services may promote rehabilitation among 
offenders who commit even the most serious offenses.  Incarceration, 
however, remains the default response to juvenile crime.  The Grant decision 
was a step in the right direction to ensure that providing non-incorrigible 
juvenile offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release based on 
demonstrated ability for reform, can be done as effectively as possible in 
view of the needs for each individual offender and society overall.  
Recovery-oriented vocational rehabilitation services can elicit positive 
change and prepare offenders to reenter the community and meaningfully 
participate within the workforce, giving back to, rather than taking from, 
society. 
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